Xi Jinping, Not Trump, Will Stop China’s Rise (Part 1)

Obsession with Taiwan tops China’s convoluted grab for global power

NG WENG HOONG in Vancouver
January 6, 2024, Monday, 1.45 pm. Word count: 5,520. Updated January 9

Donald Trump has collected some of America’s biggest anti-China hawks (1) for his proposed Cabinet in the second coming of his presidency. Yet, he will struggle to contain China given the United States’s own set of mounting problems: the wars (2) in Ukraine and the Middle East; immigration (3); the record levels of government debt (4) and budget deficit (5), both out-of-control and still rising (6); the nation’s faltering infrastructure (7); and escalating security threats from domestic terror groups (8) and external forces (9). Assuming the 47^th president doesn’t end up in jail (10), he will be more focused on fortifying the U.S. and reducing its exposure to the world’s problems than take on another external challenge.

Fortunately for Trump, the threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is being blunted by an improbable “ally” operating at the highest level inside Beijing.

Xi Jinping has made a career of being an unlikely winner during his long climb to become the PRC’s supreme leader. He is now the most powerful leader in the country’s 75-year history, surpassing even founder Mao Zedong. If Xi stays the course and the conditions permit, he could land his biggest and most far-fetched role yet as the man who stopped China’s rise. He would be doing Trump a huge favour without being asked.

In surviving China’s cannibalistic politics, Xi played to his two biggest assets, his birthright and reputation, to exploit the CCP’s weak system of governance.

He was already well-known and had a certain level of privilege as the son of Xi Zhongxun, a legendary revolutionary who served and suffered under Mao for decades. Xi Jinping used his birthright to gain the power and status that he believes is his entitlement (11) as a member of China’s super elite. At the same time, he kept humble, and was not known to flaunt his privilege in a way or degree that would have threatened his career. Where there were scandals (12), he successfully relegated them to the realm of gossip and hearsay. In Chinese politics, birthright is a double-edged sword with those of elite lineage particularly prized for takedown.

Xi’s main asset was perhaps his carefully cultivated reputation as being the least likely to make waves. He avoided offending the powerful while quietly nurturing a network of key allies on his way up. He positioned himself as a loyal, competent, and obedient servant of the party while hiding his ambitious streak and radical ideological leanings. By staying above the constant factional bloodletting, he ended up in the most unlikely position as nobody’s enemy.

When China’s most powerful job of general secretary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became available, Xi was the default compromise candidate (13) among the squabbling party elders. Everyone felt safe, or thought that they were safe, when they gave him the keys to the kingdom in November 2012.

One of them was a former mentor, Hu Jintao, who as Xi’s immediate predecessor was seated next to him at the CCP’s 20^th National Congress in October 2022. At the closing ceremony of the six-day gathering, the 79-year-old elder statesman was unexpectedly pulled out and escorted from his seat (14) by two men in front of a shocked live audience of more than 2,200 party delegates. The likely orchestrated humiliation of the previous CCP general secretary and president of China was quickly broadcast uncensored to the world. Xi remained seated, barely acknowledging Hu who tried to resist his “minders”. Xi’s display of seeming contempt conveyed his position of power amid reports that he would no longer tolerate the shadow politics of past presidents, especially that of his immediate predecessor who still had supporters inside the party.

Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZBG2bD-TE9g&ab_channel=CNA

The Making of Trump’s Helper
Hu Jintao’s forced exit at the party’s 20^th National Congress was a fitting finale to the theatre that Xi Jinping had scripted for his total power grab (15).

The veteran China watcher Willy Wo-Lap Lam (16) was prescient in his call as early as 2015 that Xi was plotting to remain in charge beyond his expected two terms in office ending in 2023. This was confirmed in March 2018 when the legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), amended the constitution to remove the term limits on the country’s presidency. By manoeuvring the NPC into that decision, Xi had broken the fragile post-Mao agreement that the president should serve only two five-year terms.

Deng Xiaoping (17), modern China’s reformer who began pulling the country out of its Maoist nightmare from 1978, had helped write the rules to prevent the centralization of powers by a future Mao copycat. Deng, like millions of Chinese who had suffered under Mao’s murderous rule, recognized the damage a dictator could inflict on China.

But Deng’s rules were not firmly institutionalized and failed at the first test when a Mao copycat did emerge to bend the party, the government, the military, and the nation to his will.

According to Yu Jie of Chatham House (18), the party’s National Congress, which meets every five years, “not only selects China’s leadership team but acts as a signpost indicating the direction the country will be heading in the near future, with implications for decades to come.”

Instead, it rubber-stamped Xi’s demands to complete his promotion to full dictator. The delegates at the October 2022 gathering amended (19) the CCP’s constitution to cement his core status and the central role of his political thought within the party, elected Xi loyalists to monopolize the elite Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) (20), and removed rivals to ensure he would rule without challenge. Premier Li Keqiang, a past Xi rival and constant counterweight, was forced to retire as he was not given the term extension. The more liberal Wang Yang and Hu Chunhua, each with a significant factional following, were ousted from the seven-member PSC to make way for Xi’s clones. Hu, also a potential rival of Xi and aligned to Hu Jintao, wasn’t even among the 24 members elected to the lower ranking Politburo. Months later, Li, 68, was gone for good after he reportedly died of a heart attack.

Lam was damning in his assessment of “China’s new Emperor” for packing his latest Cabinet with “unalloyed supporters” to serve his third five-year term.

Their “expertise are in areas such as ideology, propaganda and ‘party construction’” whose role was to consolidate Xi’s “conservative, quasi-Maoist policies”, Lam wrote.

By late 2022, Xi had reached a new peak unscaled by any ruler in the long history of Chinese politics. He had control over 1.4 billion people, the world’s second largest economy, its largest standing military, and a global surveillance reach comprising a network of spies supported by the best monitoring technology available. Xi had dedicated his life to acquiring those powers for the avowed purpose of turning China into the utopian communist state (21) supposedly envisioned by Karl Marx, Mao, and Confucius. Under Xi, China would be “rejuvenated” to become the world’s leading superpower that would go on to reshape the crumbling U.S-led international order for the good of all humanity (22).

The Dictator’s Paradox
Two years on, China is showing few signs of rejuvenation. Instead, the supreme leader is struggling to contain his nerves in the face of the country’s mounting problems.

In raising unrealistic expectations about his new powers, he is under pressure to perform miracles like wipe out “corruption” in Chinese politics, nurture paradigm-shifting innovation and entrepreneurism in an authoritarian environment, motivate an increasingly demoralized workforce, and create “win-win” outcomes out of China’s difficult relationships with a host of countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In promoting Chinese ascendancy, he has fanned both Western and Asian fears about the China Threat and made Beijing a bigger target for the incoming Trump administration.

The paradox of Xi’s peak supremacy is that he has made China more vulnerable to infighting, turmoil, and decline.

On the domestic front, he has amassed a long list of enemies who would be willing to work with foreigners to take him down. By overriding Deng’s political reforms, he has created the conditions for strife when his succession inevitably comes into question.

Xi faces a host of immediate challenges largely of his own making. He is unable to reverse the damage inflicted on the economy by some of his arbitrary and nationalistic policies. There is growing international distrust (23) of China amid rising tensions with the West and neighbouring countries in Asia, and Beijing’s dubious neutrality in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Within the party and the military, Xi has lost the fight to cover up their continuing power struggles (24) which means he is still facing open resistance. China’s youth are losing hope in their country’s future while businesspeople and bureaucrats are increasingly afraid of taking risk.

In November, Xi told Singapore’s visiting senior minister Lee Hsien Loong that he remains confident in China’s economic prospects “in the long run” (25). His comment drew attention to his silence about the immediate term which makes for grim reading. The Chinese economy faces years of slow growth, according to the World Bank (26) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (27). China is groaning under a heavy debt overload from its overleveraged real estate sector, a population that is ageing and in decline at the same time, and the uncertainty surrounding its much-touted tech sector (28). The Wall Street Journal estimates that China’s households have lost a total of US$18 trillion (29) in the country’s property meltdown since 2021.

Lee, described by Xi as an old and good friend of China, said the hard part out loud. The former prime minister of Singapore told his host that China must (30) “revive the vibrancy, the confidence, the optimism, the innovation and entrepreneurship which have created breakthroughs, unicorns and tremendous sense of dynamism and transformation, which have carried them all the way nearly 50 years since 1978, since they started reform and opening up”.

Lee had delivered a not-too-subtle rebuke with a reminder that China’s success was built largely by Xi’s predecessors.

China’s economic growth has slowed under Xi Jinping. Source: BBC

Despite Xi’s brave front, Beijing is deeply worried about the economy. The regime recently launched a 10-trillion-yuan package (31) to deal with local government debt while the central bank has announced major stimulus measures (32) in an attempt to stave off a persistent deflationary threat (33).

Whatever Xi is attempting, the Chinese economy will not return to the golden pre-COVID era when it often grew by eight to 10 percent annually. While still expanding at a faster rate than the global average, the economy is falling behind the country’s rising social demands and Beijing’s expanding security and military expenditures.

Millions of educated young people are “lying flat” (34) in silent protest at their dwindling life prospects. Youth unemployment (35), mostly among university and high-school graduates, has been holding firmly at dangerously high rates of 15% to 18% over the past two years (36). The 10 million Chinese youth (37) who graduate from universities and colleges every year face a bleak future as Xi has hobbled the real estate, technology, and education sectors that traditionally created some of the country’s most coveted jobs. For the first time in decades, a generation of Chinese youth is experiencing a decline in living standards (38) leading many to give up on traditional career and marriage goals. If Xi is unable to reverse the trend, he could face the prospect of social unrest from the young and educated in the coming years.

Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/china/youth-unemployment-rate

Equally concerning is the plight of some 400 million “invisible” blue-collar workers (39), or about 29% of the country’s total population, who have long suffered from the lack of job security and social support. Despite its much acclaimed economic miracle of the past decades, China still has a sizeable underclass of working poor.

The mental (40) and emotional (41) health of China’s urban population of more than 900 million is another source of worry. Many are still suffering from the human rights abuses (42) and trauma (43) of Beijing’s draconian measures imposed on them during the arbitrary COVID lockdowns (44) of 2020 to 2022. The damage could be a contributing factor to the recent outbreaks of mass fatal public attacks (45) by severely repressed and depressed people. What else lurks in the collective psyche of a people so brutalized by Beijing’s COVID policies may never be known as the regime has refused to even acknowledge their effects.

A small group of Chinese is dealing with the country’s decline by migrating, legally and otherwise. Many are gambling with their lives and those of their families by paying an enormous fortune to trek the death routes of Panama (46) and Mexico (47) to illegally enter the United States and the Balkans (48) for Europe. Middle-class Chinese families joining poor South Americans as economic refugees has become quite the phenomenon (49) over the past two years.

China’s perennial scourge of capital flight (50), led by the wealthy and skilled, is gaining momentum (51) again since Xi’s promotion to ruler for life. Foreign companies (52), once the biggest defenders of international engagement with Beijing, have joined in the exodus at a time when China needs their investment to shore up economic confidence.

The IMF (53) has pointed to a new worrying trend: the sharp decline in foreign direct investment into China, hovering at a record low of less than 0.5% to the GDP in recent years.

Source: IMF

In a special report in August 2024, the IMF blamed “an increase in geopolitical risk and economic policy uncertainty” for scaring off foreign capital. The IMF left no doubt that it holds Beijing responsible.

At its height, FDI accounted for 6.5% of China’s GDP in 2006-2007 when foreign businesses were extremely bullish about the country’s prospects. Then, China was at the peak of its economic and political liberalisation process.

Going the opposite direction, China’s spending on domestic security and the military has risen at a faster rate than the economy. Geopolitical tensions between China and its immediate neighbours in Asia and the West along with fears of domestic unrest and espionage will continue to fuel security-related spending. Officially, China’s military budget (54) will rise by 7.2% to a record RMB1.665 trillion or US$233 billion in 2024, although the actual spending is probably more than double the published figure.

“It marks the third year since COVID-19 hit that the budget has grown by above 7%,” said the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “Adjusted for purchasing power parity, the core 2024 defence budget would come to US$439 billion, while total military expenditure would reach US$574 billion.”

It is no coincidence that China enjoyed its biggest economic expansion between 1980 and 2012 when it had good relations with much of the world, especially the West. With no involvement in external conflict, China could afford to focus on its economy, which grew at an annual rate of 12.6% over that 32-year period. Since Xi took charge in 2013, China’s economy has grown at a still impressive but slower annual rate of 7.2% between 2013 and 2022, according to World Bank data. Those rates are expected to fall significantly in the coming years. While COVID was a major factor in the recent slowdown, Beijing’s crackdown on its real estate, technology and education sectors along with rising trade tensions with the West and security issues with its Asian neighbours have dented investor confidence in the Chinese economy.

Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream
A key part of Xi’s Chinese Dream (55) is tied to China building friendly ties with the outside world.

Yet, Xi is overseeing the darkest phase in China’s foreign relations since Mao’s rule from 1949 to 1976. Mao’s disastrous experiments on the economy (56) from 1958 to 1962 caused the death of at least 30 million Chinese people through starvation, disease, and torture. China’s failed attempt to ‘leap’ ahead of the West made Mao paranoid, leading him to launch the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 to reassert control over the country. His Red Guards terrorised the Chinese people while the CCP stepped up its export of armed revolution to other countries that became a part of Mao’s policy and legacy.

Unsurprisingly, Mao’s foreign adventure failed, leaving behind a bitter legacy of anti-China (and anti-Chinese) sentiments in parts of Asia and the West that have endured till today.

Xi is faring better but is still far from winning over world opinion. His Chinese Dream (57) is being undermined by the contradiction between China’s declared wish to be everyone’s friend and its increasingly aggressive drive for hegemony. Xi’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) (58) , Global Security Initiative (GSI) (59), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) (60) have the nominal support of most developing countries, which are largely driven by China’s offer of potential economic gains and resentment against the U.S.-led international order. Russia is a firm supporter due to its dependence on China to sustain President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. China can also rely on a small group of staunchly anti-Western countries. The rest of the Global South is a mixed bag as their support for Beijing is tied to Chinese aid, investment, and economic opportunities. If China tightens up its purse strings, many will vanish as fair-weather friends.

Significantly, India (61) shares Western suspicion of China as the Global South’s two heavyweights battle each other for influence on the world stage. Southeast Asian countries (62) are on the Chinese bandwagon partly for the economic ride, but Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore retain strong ties with the West and India as they too fear Beijing’s intentions. China’s worsening territorial disputes with its neighbours, especially its thuggish attempts to dominate the South China Sea, contradict Xi’s promise to forge “win-win” relations with other countries.

The Belt and Road Initiative
Xi’s most ambitious foray at winning win global influence has lost its way since its launch in 2013 (63) to develop an economic corridor to connect Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Xi unveiled his signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) vision to great expectations that China would use its infrastructure expertise and enormous foreign exchange reserves to build a global “community of common destiny” and bring prosperity to every corner of the world.

Instead, BRI projects have been accused of saddling participating countries with heavy debt (64) and corrupt practices (65) while human rights (66), socio-cultural (67), and labour abuses (68), and environmental problems have occurred under the watchful eyes of the Chinese government.

The U.S. Council of Foreign Relations (69) said the BRI is struggling as a result of “poor risk management and a lack of attention to detail and cohesion from the Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks, private companies, and local governments involved.”

For now, China remains a partner of choice for many developing countries who complain that they are being ignored by the West and international development agencies.

In a landmark study of 129 countries involved in the BRI, AidData found (70) that “79% of leaders surveyed viewed Beijing as actively supporting their countries’ development, and 38% selected the PRC as their infrastructure partner of choice, outstripping other major powers.”

“Three-quarters of leaders reported that the PRC had increased the number and size of projects in their country since 2012. The majority reported an uptick in Chinese laborers, suppliers, and firms to implement these projects.”

Despite AidData’s less pessimistic tone compared with its previous assessment in 2021, the BRI remains a troubled undertaking for China and many of the participating countries that have borrowed heavily from Beijing.

“Total outstanding debt -- including principal but excluding interest -- from borrowers in the developing world to China is at least US$1.1 trillion,” the 2023 report said.

“Beijing is navigating an unfamiliar and uncomfortable role -- as the world’s largest official debt collector.”

It is not clear who will be the biggest loser: China or its debtors who will struggle to pay back. Due to its inexperience in this role, China is likely to take a financial hit as 80% of “its overseas lending portfolio in the developing world is currently supporting countries in financial distress.”

For all its generous spending to buy goodwill, China has taken serious reputational damage, with its approval rating among developing countries falling from 56% in 2019 to 40% in 2021, said AidData.

“The terms and conditions of BRI financing were often shielded from public view through strict nondisclosure agreements, which in turn set off alarm bells with institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,” observed Mark Green, (71) the president and CEO of the Wilson Center.

A think tank linked to the Chinese government has acknowledged BRI’s problems.

“Several investments in the Belt and Road Initiative have had to be stopped, mothballed or cancelled due to financial (e.g., difficulties in financing or servicing debt) and operational reasons (e.g. due to travel restrictions or problems in supply chains),” said a study published by the Fanhai International School of Finance (FISF) at Fudan University in Shanghai, China.

Author Christoph Nedophil Wang (72) found that more than half the BRI’s announced coal-fired power plants have been mothballed.

“In order to avoid reputational, social and environmental risks arising from stopped, mothballed or cancelled projects, plans should be developed and implemented by financial institutions including insurance companies, developers, local governments and relevant Chinese authorities that compensate any losses to workers and companies up to a specific extent,” he recommended without going into details.

Wang also called for the remediation of “nature around mothballed and particularly stopped projects. This also helps avoid having skeleton constructions serve as a reminder of unfinished projects.”

The US$62 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (73) in Balochistan province is the BRI’s biggest and most ambitious project. It has also become a showpiece in Chinese mismanagement and a long-term drain on China’s financial and political capital. The financial viability (74) of CPEC’s various projects is in doubt while local militia groups opposed to Chinese investment in western Pakistan have been terrorising and killing Chinese workers.

“After US$55.2 billion in aid and credit (75) for new highways, power projects, and rescue loans, CPEC has struggled to generate sustained economic benefits amidst a deteriorating security situation marred by poor governance,” wrote Hong Zhang and Ammar A. Malik (76).

Relations between the two countries have plunged with China openly venting anger (77) at Pakistan for failing to stop the terror attacks.

The BRI has also hit a roadblock in the Middle East and Europe in the aftermath of the wars involving Israel and Ukraine. Israel has lost faith in China for seemingly siding with Palestine, Hamas, and Hezbollah while the Arab world (78) is frustrated by Beijing’s failure to show any leadership since the start of the conflict on October 7, 2023 when Hamas attacked Israel.

European countries are deeply divided on their China policies but seem in agreement that Beijing cannot be trusted (79). China’s supposedly neutral stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is viewed as deceitful given that Beijing has increased its support for Moscow since the war began on February 24, 2022. On December 6, 2023, Italy (80) announced that it would not renew the 2019 memorandum of understanding (MOU) that had made it the first and only country in the G7 to participate in the BRI.

Does China Have Friends?
Shortly after he officially took power in 2013, Xi raised expectations that he would be the new flagbearer for globalization, free trade, and, in his own words, the builder of a global “community of common destiny” (81). Instead, he has proved to be probably the most divisive world leader, surpassing even Donald Trump. Since 2017, China has decisively pivoted away from the West, forcing many countries to choose between aligning with it or the U.S.

China has positioned itself as the new leader of the developing world (Global South) (82) to break the stranglehold of the U.S. and its Western allies on global power. Yet despite spending heavily on influence-building around the world, China has not won over the Global South. Influential members India (83), Brazil (84), Nigeria (85), and Indonesia (86) along with most of Asia harbour varying degrees of resentment against the West but they are also wary of China’s unpredictability, nationalistic behaviour, and propensity to be a bully. Even in Africa and the Arab world, where memories of Western colonial exploitation are fresh and deep, China’s popularity is far from guaranteed and universal. China’s dream of replacing the U.S. dollar with an alternative currency to break Washington’s grip on the international trade system continues to wash up against the hard reality of economics.

China’s staunchest allies to change the world include Russia, North Korea, Iran, South Africa, Cuba, Venezuela, Yemen, and what was recently Syria. These are countries that are long mired in conflict, political unrest, and underdevelopment, with some at risk of becoming failed states.

The China-Russia link (87) is the spine of this new anti-Western front, but it is fragile and laden with historical baggage, including centuries of conflict between the two countries. That link currently relies heavily on the recent personal relationship between Xi and his Russian counterpart, President Vladmir Putin. It is not known if they genuinely trust each other, especially considering how Xi’s idol, Mao, regarded Russia as the biggest villain and beneficiary of foreign plunder of China during its Century of Humiliation from 1839 to 1949. Mao’s bitter fallout with the Russian leadership from the 1950s led to the world’s two largest communist states fighting a border war in March 1969 that could have resulted in the use of nuclear weapons. Ironically, the deadly clash on Damansky Island (88) in the Russian Far East (or Zhenbao Island when it was owned by the Chinese) contributed to China’s eventual divorce from Soviet communism. China would complete its defection to the West a decade later when it established diplomatic ties with the U.S. on January 1, 1979.

Mao’s unresolved anger against Russia (89) remains widely shared by most Chinese who retain bitter memories of Imperial Russia committing genocide (90) and seizing large sections of old China in the 19^th century. If Xi were to truly fulfil his mission to rejuvenate China, he would have to take back the resource-rich Russian Far East, Siberia, and Sakhalin that used to be Chinese property. Here’s my analysis of Xi’s strategy towards Russia (91) written a month after Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Putin is fully aware of the latent threat of Chinese grudges, having seen how Beijing regularly whips up anti-Japanese sentiments over Imperial Japan’s war crimes in China before and during the Second World War. Russia, by contrast, has never been held to account for committing far worse atrocities and plunder against China. Putin is also mindful of Xi’s mastery at concealing his true feelings and strategic intent. A fallout between these two seeming best friends would be something to behold.

In any case, the former KGB spymaster struck first by pulling off a coup of his own when he recruited North Korea to fight his war in Ukraine. The deal was sealed last June when Putin made his first visit to Pyongyang in 24 years to sign a landmark mutual defence agreement (92) with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

The “breakthrough document”, as described by Putin himself, overhauled Russia’s policy on North Korea with a new agreement that stipulates that one would come to the defence of the other during conflict. This clause was invoked almost immediately when Kim sent thousands of his soldiers (93) to fight Ukraine in October. The agreement also set the foundation for Moscow’s long-term strategy to begin military and technical cooperation with Pyongyang that could be read as a challenge to Beijing’s influence.

The speed and extent of the Putin-Kim embrace alarmed not just the world, but also Xi who was likely caught out by the intimacy that had developed between his two closest allies. Both desperately dependent on China for political and economic support, the new deal will give Moscow and Pyongyang some breathing space from Beijing’s suffocating embrace.

As geopolitical consultant Samuel Ramani (94) noted, North Korea has sharpened the divergent views between Russia and China over security issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

“The Sino-Russian cleavage over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is especially pronounced.”

China blames “external stakeholders” for North Korea’s nuclear sabre-rattling yet worries that Pyongyang’s actions might motivate the U.S. to deploy additional strategic nuclear-capable assets to the region.

“Russia has no such qualms about North Korea’s nuclear program. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which has an ultranationalist ideological bent, has supported North Korea’s right to pursue a nuclear deterrent for years,” Ramani wrote.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria on December 8 was another major setback for Xi as he ended his first two years as dictator-in-chief on a depressing note.

Xi had personally invested in President Bashar al-Assad’s longevity in Syria as a foundational piece in China’s struggle for a coherent Middle East strategy. In September 2023, Xi invited Assad to Beijing where they signed a China-Syria strategic partnership (95).

Although the agreement has been derided for lacking substance, Xi did boldly promise China’s support for Syria “in opposing foreign interference, rejecting unilateralism and bullying, and safeguarding national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

He also pledged to help Syria “in conducting reconstruction, enhancing counter-terrorism capacity building, and promoting a political settlement of the Syrian issue following the ‘Syrian-led, Syrian-owned’ principle.”

As with his lofty slogans to the world, Xi’s promises to Assad have turned out to be empty. China watched passively as the Assad regime collapsed within weeks of a joint assault by opposition forces. Forget about “safeguarding national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Xi could not even offer asylum to Assad and his family who fled to Moscow, not Beijing. The “strategic partnership” will serve as a reminder of China’s hollowness in supporting its allies in their time of need.

But more than Beijing’s diplomatic reputation is now at risk. Assad had helped keep Islamic extremist forces from taking the fight to China’s restive western region of Xinjiang. For years, the Assad regime employed brutal tactics and repression to stop a disparate group of extremist forces from exporting revolution to the region and beyond. The most powerful group to emerge in post-Assad Syria is the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. For years, the U.S. had a US$10 million bounty prize on Jolani who fought alongside Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). On December 20, the U.S. State Department (96) announced it would lift the bounty after holding a “very productive” meeting with Jolani in Damascus, even though the terrorist label on HTS remains.

One of the HTS’s victorious allies, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) (97), has vowed to now turn to fighting China over its ill-treatment of the Uyghur Muslim population (98) who are indigenous to Xinjiang. Formerly known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the group has been designated by the U.N., China, the European Union and Britain as a terror organisation. As TIP steps up its military campaign for Xinjiang’s separation, Xi will have another potential crisis to add to his growing list for 2025. But he will not find any sympathy from the U.S. which removed the terrorist label from ETIM in 2020.

Trump’s China Challenge
Trump will encounter a very different China from the one he dealt with at the start of his first term in 2017. Xi is far less confident in 2025 than he was eight year ago as he struggles with the souring of his Chinese Dream that is now in full swing.

Not that Trump will have an easy time himself with his own and America’s problems.

But he will have a few advantages over the supreme leader. The U.S. economy is in far stronger shape than China’s. The world is once again looking to the U.S. for direction, having seen through Xi’s empty slogans. Contrary to predictions about its demise, the US dollar (99) has grown stronger on investor demand to reach a near two-year high against the rest of the world’s currencies.

While Xi has assumed the entire burden of government in his role as the “Chairman of Everything” (100), Trump can still count on America’s institutions along with the country’s network of international allies. Xi is increasingly suspicious of his own hand-picked officials, witness the endless purges in China’s military establishment. The poor state of Chinese governance that allowed him to so easily climb up the hierarchy, amass powers, jail his critics and rivals, and change the country’s laws at will is now his enemy.

Trump will face an increasingly anxious Xi if the Chinese economy continues to flounder and Beijing is unable to regain credibility on the world stage. Like Mao, Xi could be tempted to take out his failings on both his people and neighbouring countries, with Taiwan particularly vulnerable.

Trump did the hard part of turning mainstream America against Xi’s China during his first term. For his second term, he must strike a balance to allow China to continue down its path of decline while ensuring that it doesn’t result in a collapse leading to political instability and possibly a war over Taiwan or anywhere in Asia.

Most importantly, Trump must rein in America’s war hawks and their defence contractors who are eager for a new theatre of conflict to open in Asia. A U.S.-China war would be catastrophic for all.

The second part of this commentary will focus on Taiwan and how the island republic has creatively dealt with its increasing diplomatic isolation resulting from China’s undeclared act of war.

Edited versions of this blog have been published by Pancouver, EurAsia Review and ChinaFactor. Links:
https://pancouver.ca/xi-jinping-not-trump-will-stop-chinas-rise-part-1
https://www.eurasiareview.com/08012025-xi-jinping-not-trump-will-stop-chinas-rise-analysis
https://chinafactor.news/2025/01/14/xi-jinping-will-stop-the-rise-of-china-not-trump


FOOTNOTES
1. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/13/trump-signals-hard-line-on-china-with-hawkish-cabinet-picks
Erin Hale, Al Jazeera, November 13, 2024. Trump signals hard line on China with hawkish cabinet picks

2. https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-sleepwalking-toward-war-ukraine-middle-east
Justin Logan, Cato, September 24, 2024. Biden is sleepwalking toward war in Ukraine and Middle East

3. https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/expected-immigration-policies-under-a-second-trump-administration-and-their-health-and-economic-implications
Drishti Pillai and Samantha Artiga, KFF, November 21, 2024. Expected immigration policies under a second Trump administration and their health and economic implications

4. https://www.crfb.org/press-releases/gross-national-debt-reaches-36-trillion
The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Nov 22, 2024. Gross national debt reaches US$36 trillion

5. https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deficit-tracker
Bipartisan Policy, November 4, 2024. U.S. deficit tracker

6. https://www.gao.gov/americas-fiscal-future
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GA), February 15, 2024. The nation’s unsustainable fiscal path

7. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/state-us-infrastructure
James McBride, Noah Berman, and Anshu Siripurapu, CSIS, September 20, 2023. The state of U.S. infrastructure

8. https://www.csis.org/analysis/rising-threat-anti-government-domestic-terrorism-what-data-tells-us
Riley McCabe, CSIS, October 21, 2024. The rising threat of anti-government domestic terrorism

9. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf
Director of National Intelligence, February 5, 2024. Annual Threat Assessment Report: Worldwide threats to the national security of the United States.

10. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/judge-orders-trump-sentenced-hush-money-case-jan-10-says-wont-incarcer-rcna186189
Dareh Gregorian and Tom Winter, NBC, January 3, 2025. Judge orders Trump to be sentenced in hush money case on January 10, but says he won’t be incarcerated

11. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING3128_a.html
Wikileaks, November 16, 2009. Portrait of Vice President Xi Jinping: “Ambitious survivor” of the Cultural Revolution. “Xi is a true elitist at heart” and Xi has a genuine sense of "entitlement.

12. https://web.archive.org/web/20240925201546/https://www.thetimes.com/culture/books/article/red-emperor-xi-jinping-new-china-michael-sheridan-review-h3qvb6s6w
Julia Lovell, The Times, September 14 2024. Book review. “The Red Emperor” by Michael Sheridan: is a boozy philanderer running China? The life of Xi Jinping, the president of China, is shrouded in secrecy, so can we trust this racy biography?

13. https://uk.news.yahoo.com/xi-jinping-china-s-new-leader--the-cave-dwelling-communist-with-the-popstar-wife.html
Chris Parsons, 15 November 2012. Xi Jinping: The ‘compromise’ Communist with the popstar wife who became China’s new leader

14. www.youtube.com/watch?v=9mbdMQyIZ7I
Channel News Asia, October 25, 2022. Hu Jintao’s unexpected exit from China’s Party Congress

15. https://jamestown.org/program/the-20th-party-congress-xi-jinping-exerts-overwhelming-control-over-personnel-but-offers-no-clues-on-reviving-the-economy
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Jamestown Foundation, October 24, 2022. The 20th Party Congress: Xi Jinping exerts overwhelming control over personnel, but offers no clues on reviving the economy

16. https://asiatimes.com/2016/12/trump-boosts-xis-bid-stay-beyond-2022
Ng Weng Hoong, Asia Times. Trump boosts Xi’s bid to stay beyond 2022

17. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule
Susan L. Shirk, Journal of Democracy, April 2018. China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule

18. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2022-08/guide-chinese-communist-partys-national-congress
Yu Jie, Chatham House, October 12, 2022. A guide to the Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress

19. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/22/xi-jinping-tightens-grip-on-power-as-chinas-communist-party-elevates-his-status
Helen Davidson, Verna Yu and agencies, The Guardian, October 22, 2022. Xi Jinping tightens grip on power as China’s Communist party elevates his status

20. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/23/whos-on-chinas-new-politburo-standing-committee
Al Jazeera, October 23, 2022. Who’s on China’s new Politburo Standing Committee? Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Xi

21. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwdt/ztzl/NEW_srxxgcjjpjjsx/yjcg/yw/202401/t20240123_1363634.html
National Development and Reform Commission, December 29, 2023. Xi Jinping’s Thought on Economy: A Scientific Theory for Guiding Construction of a Modern Socialist Country

22. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202412/t20241218_11497818.html
Wang Yi, PRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2024. Riding the trend of the times with a strong sense of responsibility

23. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/chinas-approach-to-foreign-policy-gets-largely-negative-reviews-in-24-country-survey
Pew Research Center, July 27, 2023. China’s approach to foreign policy gets largely negative reviews in 24-country survey

24. https://www.yahoo.com/news/xi-says-inevitable-ruling-party-015244744.html
Josh Xiao, Bloomberg, December 15, 2024. Xi defends purges as part of ‘inevitable’ internal party strife

25. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/zyxw/202411/t20241127_11534068.html
Foreign Ministry, People’s Republic of China, November 26, 2024. Xi Jinping meets with Senior Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong

26. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview
The World Bank, October 24, 2024. Over the medium term, China’s economy is expected to undergo a structural slowdown, reflecting adverse demographics, tepid productivity growth, and rising constraints to a debt-fueled, investment-driven growth model

27. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/11/15/Chinas-Path-to-Sustainable-and-Balanced-Growth-557369
IMF, November 15, 2024. China’s potential growth could slow to around 3.8% on average between 2025-30 and to around 2.8% on average over 2031-40 in the absence of major reforms

28. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/why-china-tech-isn-t-rebounding-after-beijing-crackdown-ended
Bloomberg, September 13, 2024. Why China tech isn’t rebounding after Beijing crackdown ended

29. https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-dow-sp500-nasdaq-live-01-02-2025/card/breaking-down-china-s-economic-challenges-7fj1NJnCBe3SsogRDjvU
Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2025. $18 trillion: the estimated destruction of household wealth in China caused by the country's property meltdown since 2021

30. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/spore-needs-to-work-extra-hard-to-maintain-valuable-ties-with-china-amid-uncertainty-says-sm-lee
Tan Dawn Wei, The Straits Times, November 29, 2024. Singapore needs to work extra hard to maintain valuable ties with China amid global uncertainty: SM Lee

31. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/11/08/china-expected-to-announce-highly-anticipated-fiscal-stimulus-package.html
Evelyn Cheng, CNBC, November 7, 2024. China announces $1.4 trillion package over five years to tackle local governments’ ‘hidden’ debt

32. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjd5xlv03jxo
Peter Hoskins, BBC News, September 24, 2024. China unveils raft of measures to boost economy

33. https://wsjchina.cmail20.com/t/d-e-sslkdk-drdlkuihdd-r
Lingling Wei, Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2024. China’s bond yields scream the ‘d’ word

34. https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/lying-flat
David Bandurski, China Media Project, July 17, 2023. “Lying Flat”, an informal social movement to reject social pressure to achieve success through consumerism

35. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/chinas-youth-unemployment-hits-fresh-high-economic-slowdown-restrictiv-rcna172183
Lee Ying Shan, CNBC, September 23, 2024. China’s youth unemployment hits fresh high amid economic slowdown and restrictive hiring policies. Companies are refusing to hire new graduates amid an economic slump and restrictive hiring policies that are also making it harder to fire old workers.

36. https://tradingeconomics.com/china/youth-unemployment-rate
Trading Economics. China’s youth unemployment rate, January 2022 to Oct 2024

37. https://www.statista.com/statistics/227272/number-of-university-graduates-in-china
China’s Ministry of Education. Number of graduates from public colleges and universities in China between 2013 and 2023

38. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/rotten-tail-kids-chinas-rising-youth-unemployment-breeds-new-working-class-4557941
Reuters, August 21, 2024. ‘Rotten-tail kids’: China’s rising youth unemployment breeds new working class

39. www.chineseconsumers.news/p/china-migrant-workers
Yaling Jiang, Chinese Consumer News, November 29, 2024. ‘People Like Me’: We need to talk about China’s invisible blue-collar workers

40. https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(22)01051-0/fulltext
The Lancet, June 11, 2022. Mental health after China’s prolonged lockdowns

41. https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychiatry/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1147530/full
Xinyan Xiong, Rita Xiaochen Hu, Chuanfang Chen, Wenyuan Ning. Frontiers in Psychiatry, April 26, 2023. Effects of risk exposure on emotional distress among Chinese adults during the COVID-19 pandemic

42. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/12/china-unprecedented-nationwide-protests-against-abuses
Human Rights Watch, January 12, 2023. China: Unprecedented nationwide protests against abuses. Xi consolidates power amid covid-19, economic challenges

43. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/21/china-tries-to-bury-the-memory-and-trauma-of-zero-covid-era
Frederik Kelter, Al Jazeera, December 21, 2023. China tries to ‘bury the memory’ and trauma of zero-COVID era

44. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63310524
BBC, October 20, 2022. China Covid: The politics driving the hellish lockdowns

45. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/world-crazy-spate-mass-casualty-incidents-china-reveal-pent-up-grievances-and-anger-4759366
Melody Chan, Channel News Asia, November 24, 2024. ‘The world is crazy’: Spate of mass casualty incidents in China reveal pent up grievances and anger

46. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/through-darien-gap-new-path-chinese-asylum-seekers-united-states
Joshua Peng, Wilson Center, March 20, 2024. Through the Darién Gap: a new path for Chinese asylum seekers to the United States

47. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/chinese-migrants-fastest-growing-group-us-mexico-border-60-minutes-transcript
Sharyn Alfonsi, CBS News, February 4, 2024. Chinese migrants are the fastest growing group crossing from Mexico into U.S. at southern border

48. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/25/a-path-towards-freedom-the-new-route-to-europe-for-desperate-chinese-migrants
Amy Hawkins, September 25, 2024. A path towards freedom: the new route to Europe for desperate Chinese migrants

49. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/interactive/walk-the-line/index.html
Channel News Asia, December 31, 2024. Walk the Line: An interactive journey through perilous China-US migration route

50. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/foreign-capital-exodus-from-china-accelerates
Tianlei Huang and Zhuowen Li, Australian Institute of International Affairs, September 30, 2024. Foreign capital exodus from China accelerates

51. https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-economy-capital-flight-2ba6391b
Jason Douglas and Rebecca Feng, WSJ, October 23, 2024. The Quarter-Trillion-Dollar Rush to Get Money Out of China. Chinese residents have been using everything from crypto to fine art to move their money overseas

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Bloomberg News, November 9, 2024. Foreign firms pull more money from China’s slowing economy

53. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2024/276/article-A004-en.xml
International Monetary Fund (IMF), August 30, 2024. China’s foreign direct investment

54. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/03/chinas-defence-budget-boost-cant-mask-real-pressures
Meia Nouwens and Fenella McGerty, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 8, 2024. China’s defence budget boost can’t mask real pressures

55. https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-third-revolution
Elizabeth Economy, 2018. The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (excerpt via U.S. Council on Foreign Relations)

56. https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/maos-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-in-four-years-2081630.html
Arifa Akbar, The Independent, September 17, 2010. Mao’s Great Leap Forward ‘killed 45 million in four years’

57. https://eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/07/the-awakening-of-xis-chinese-dream
Shaheli Das, April 7, 2016. The awakening of Xi’s Chinese Dream

58. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/25/WS62b65831a310fd2b29e68816.html
China Daily, June 25, 2022. Chair’s statement of the high-level dialogue on global development

59. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/swaqsws_665306/xgxw/202403/t20240328_11272725.html
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60. http://english.scio.gov.cn/in-depth/2024-04/03/content_117103205.htm
Xinhua, April 3, 2024. Three things to know about China’s Global Civilization Initiative

61. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7916&lid=5287
Sanjeev Kumar, Indian Council of World Affairs, September 14, 2022. One year of China’s Global Development Initiative: high on rhetoric, low on substance?

62. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/ISEAS_Perspective_2023_9.pdf
Hoang Thi Ha, ISEAS, February 21, 2023. Why is China’s Global Development Initiative well received in Southeast Asia?

63. https://china.usc.edu/xi-jinping-speech-astana-kazakhstan-building-silk-road-economic-belt-central-asian-nations-september
Xi Jinping, September 7, 2013. Speech in Astana, Kazakhstan, on “Building a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Nations”

64. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html
Nyshka Chandran, CNBC, January 17, 2019. Fears of excessive debt drive more countries to cut down their Belt and Road investments

65. https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/cash-corruption-crumbling-dams-thats-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-10-years-in
Elaine Dezenski, FDD, October 17, 2023. Cash, corruption, crumbling dams — that's China’s Belt and Road Initiative, 10 years in

66. https://globalforestcoalition.org/media-release-urgent-action-required-to-halt-the-gender-environmental-and-human-rights-impacts-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative
Global Forest Coalition, September 2023. Assessing the Gender, Environmental, and Human Rights Implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

67. https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/un-committee-urges-china-to-better-regulate-business-operations-overseas
CESCR, March 3, 2023. UN committee urges China to better regulate business operations overseas

68. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/11/china-belt-and-road-dam-a-rights-disaster-for-cambodia-report
Al Jazeera, August 11, 2021. Alleged abuses linked to China’s ‘Belt and Road’ projects: report

69. https://www.cfr.org/blog/rise-and-fall-bri
Nadia Clark, April 6, 2023. The Rise and Fall of the BRI. Amidst accusations of “debt-trap diplomacy,” Xi’s flagship initiative is stymied by poor risk management.

70. https://www.aiddata.org/blog/the-bri-at-10-a-report-card-from-the-global-south
Sarina Patterson, March 26, 2024. The BRI at 10: A report card from the Global South

71. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/debt-distress-road-belt-and-road
Mark Green, Wilson Center, January 16, 2024. Debt distress on the road to “Belt and Road”

72. https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2023
Christoph Nedopil Wang, Green Finance and Development Center, February 5, 2024. China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2023

73. https://cpec.gov.pk
China Pakistan Economic Corridor

74. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-big-gamble-pakistan-10-year-scorecard-cpec
Syed Fazl-e-Haider, Lowy Institute, August 1, 2023. China’s big gamble in Pakistan: A 10-year scorecard for CPEC

75. https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Global_insights_with_national_implications.pdf
Ammar A. Malik, March 22, 2022. Global insights with national implications: AidData’s policy engagements on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

76. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/12/16/13728
Hong Zhang and Ammar A. Malik, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. December 16, 2024. Delivering promises for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: lessons learned and the path forward

77. https://archive.ph/Tq76E#selection-2205.27-2705.88
Ravi Velloor, The Straits Times, November 30, 2024. China and Pakistan: Why a sour note has seeped into ‘sweeter than honey’ ties. Islamabad is in a fix on how to assuage Beijing’s growing anger over attacks on Chinese nationals.

78. https://www.yahoo.com/news/arab-states-urge-china-play-093000645.html
South China Morning Post, December 20, 2024. Arab states urge China to ‘play greater role’ in bringing peace to the Middle East

79. https://www.cer.eu/insights/china-and-west-gap-set-grow
Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform, June 5, 2024. China and the West: The gap is set to grow.
China’s relations with the US and the EU are likely to worsen, because of both its aid for Russia and its economic strategy.

80. https://www.csis.org/analysis/italy-withdraws-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative
Ilaria Mazzocco and Andrea Leonard Palazzi, CSIS, December 14, 2023. Italy withdraws from China’s Belt and Road Initiative

81. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/epdf/10.1142/9789813278721_0005
Junsheng Wan, World Scientific, 2019. Building a Community of Common Destiny between China and the Neighboring Countries

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Eduardo Baptista, November 18, 2024. China’s Xi announces steps to support ‘Global South’ at G20 summit

83. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-has-a-china-problem-not-just-a-border-problem
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ASPI, October 15, 2024. India has a China problem, not just a border problem

84. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/investing/commodities/2024/10/23/brazil-reluctant-to-pick-between-us-and-china-in-polarized-world
Martha Beck, Mariana Durao, and Rachel Gamarski, October 23, 2024. Brazil reluctant to pick between US and China in polarized world

85. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2024.2439405?src=#d1e994
Mistura Adebusola Salaudeen and Steve Guo, Journal of Contemporary China, December 13, 2024. Efficacy of China’s Soft Power in Nigeria: Impact of Personal Engagement and Media Exposure on Lagos Residents’ Attitude Towards China

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Fadli and Yvette Tanamal, The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2024. China-Indonesia ties tested following North Natuna stand-off. Territorial tussle threatens Indonesia’s close economic relationship with China.

87. https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/05/in-beijing-xi-and-putin-solidify-partnership-in-defiance-of-west
Arthur Kaufman, China Digital Times, May 21, 2024. In Beijing, Xi and Putin solidify partnership in defiance of West

88. https://thechinaproject.com/2021/03/03/how-close-exactly-were-russia-and-china-to-nuclear-war
James Carter, The China Project, March 3, 2021. How close, exactly, were Russia and China to nuclear war?

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Alsu Tagirova, Journal of Cold War Studies, January 5, 2022. From Crisis Management to Realignment of Forces: The Diplomatic “Geometry” of the 1969–1978 Sino-Soviet Border Talks

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Shang Ssu-t’u, The Russian Massacre of 1900 (or the Anti-Chinese Pogroms of 1900)

91. https://wengcouver.substack.com/p/the-war-in-ukraine-a-weakened-russia
Ng Weng Hoong, March 26, 2022. The war in Ukraine: A weakened Russia is China’s windfall

92. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/putin-kim-agree-develop-strategic-fortress-relations-kcna-says-2024-06-18
Josh Smith and Ju-min Park, Reuters, June 19, 2024. Russia's Putin and North Korea's Kim sign mutual defence pact

93. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/north-korea-and-russia-send-political-shockwaves-ukraine-war-moves-4711161
Reuters, October 30, 2024. North Korea and Russia send political shockwaves with Ukraine war moves

94. https://www.38north.org/2024/06/the-russia-china-dprk-strategic-triangle-phantom-threat-or-geopolitical-reality
Samuel Ramani, 38 North, June 13, 2024. The Russia-China-DPRK strategic triangle: phantom threat or geopolitical reality?

95. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202309/22/WS650d5f36a310d2dce4bb7531.html
Xinhua, September 22, 2023. Xi, Assad jointly announce China-Syria strategic partnership

96. https://www.ft.com/content/79780e5f-e0bb-47db-a7e3-146ccf3b9aad
Felicia Schwartz, FT, December 21 2024. US to remove $10 million bounty for Syria’s Islamist rebel leader. American officials met Abu Mohammed al-Jolani in Damascus

97. https://www.yahoo.com/news/uyghur-fighters-syria-vow-come-190132564.html
Sophia Yan, The Telegraph, December 13, 2024. Uyghur fighters in Syria vow to come for China next. The Turkistan Islamic Party has issued a propaganda blitz highlighting their role in overthrowing Assad.

98. https://www.straight.com/news/xi-jinpings-xinjiang-paradox
Ng Weng Hoong, December 25, 2021. Xi Jinping’s Xinjiang paradox. An interview with Darren Byler on his latest book, ‘In the Camps: China’s Hi-Tech Penal Colony’.

99. https://www.marketwatch.com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-dow-futures-rise-after-losing-start-to-2025/card/u-s-dollar-index-remains-near-two-year-high-despite-slight-pullback-vtd2os5PET7jRhgQ6ioy
Vivien Lou Chen, MarketWatch, January 3, 2025. U.S. Dollar Index remains near two-year high despite slight pullback

100. https://apnews.com/article/winter-olympics-china-president-xi-jinping-b5aeeed14e662e72570df15076290830
Joe Mcdonald, AP, February 3, 2022. President Xi Jinping, China’s ‘chairman of everything’